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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the more significant remedial developments during the 
twentieth century was the rise and (partial) decline of the structural 
injunction in which courts, usually federal courts, restructure or reshape 
legislative or administrative agencies such as schools or prisons.  
Conceptually, structural remedies appear to be inconsistent with the 
judicial function.  Indeed, well established rules of equity suggest that courts 
should be reluctant to issue injunctions in cases that present continuing 
supervision problems.2  Supplementing these general equitable principles 
 
 *  Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of 
Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law. 
 2. See, e.g., Grossman v. Wegman’s Food Mkts., Inc., 350 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 
(App. Div. 1973) (“[C]ourts of equity are reluctant to grant specific performance in 
situations where such performance would require judicial supervision over a long period 
of time.”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, 2 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
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are the notions that the federal government should show comity towards 
the actions of state officials3 and that judicial power should be separate 
from legislative and executive power.4 
Despite these concerns, federal courts have entered structural relief in 
an extraordinary array of cases that have dramatically reshaped society, 
directly regulated state governments, and routinely involved courts in 
issuing orders that involve continuing supervision problems.5  Indeed, 
courts have restructured school districts,6 and regulated the running of 
prisons,7 jails,8 and institutions for the sick9 and the mentally disabled.10  
 
RESTITUTION 348–53 (2d ed. 1993). 
 3. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971) (explaining notion of 
comity as traditional respect for state functions); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551–
56 (1946) (refusing to grant requested relief because the issue was a political question for 
the state). 
 4. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888) (stating that courts of equity should 
not “invade the domain . . . of the executive and administrative department[s] of the 
government”). 
 5. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (holding that while there 
are no limits to the duration of a court’s supervision of a school district, a district court 
must return the school district to local control as soon as the constitutional violation is 
remedied); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1992) 
(containing a discussion of the importance of district courts being able to modify decrees 
to account for changes in circumstances between the parties); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 
467, 471 (1992) (holding that a district court may discontinue supervision over some 
discrete aspects of school administration); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248–49 
(1991) (describing the constitutional concerns regarding the continuation or termination 
of injunctive relief in desegregation cases). 
 6. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534–35, 542 (1979) 
(upholding an appellate decision requiring desegregation and reversing the district 
court’s opinion); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 453–55, 468 (1979) 
(affirming a district court’s enjoining a school district from discriminatory practices and 
ordering a systemwide desegregation plan); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45, 
753 (1974) (reversing and remanding to the district court with instructions to hold that all 
segregation found in Detroit schools be eliminated), aff’d, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971) (explaining, inter alia, 
that district courts should continue to observe school districts to ensure that 
desegregation orders are followed); Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 529, 535 (1st 
Cir. 1976) (affirming a district court’s ruling changing a school’s leadership in 
conjunction with a desegregation plan). 
 7. See, e.g., French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 927–28 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (issuing 
an order that had twenty-two specific provisions regarding the day-to-day management 
of a prison), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000); 
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (holding that the penitentiary will 
not be allowed to confine convicts in the future unless conditions improve), aff’d, 442 
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 8. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1140, 1152–54 (S.D. Miss. 
1977) (ordering, inter alia, that a state institution for delinquent boys was enjoined from 
a number of specific methods of behavioral control and requiring the institution to 
submit proposed remedies for a number of deficiencies in its various programs); Rhem v. 
Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769, 770, 788–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the Manhattan 
House of Detention may not resume operation until previous court orders are sufficiently 
complied with). 
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Courts have even mandated state apportionment schemes11 and 
reorganized city governments.12  Understandably, these decrees have 
generated much controversy.13 
This Article examines the structural remedy and offers some reflections 
on its appropriate use. 
II.  THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURAL REMEDY 
The development of structural remedies is generally attributed to the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of Education 
(Brown I).14  In that litigation, although the Court held that the Topeka, 
Kansas school district was illegally segregated, the Court was unwilling 
to order immediate desegregation.  Instead, the Court adopted a slow 
moving approach and deferred a remedy until its decision in Brown II.15  
The Court ordered the district to end segregation with “all deliberate 
speed.”16  As a result, the immediate effect of the decision was to leave 
black students in the same classrooms as before with no change in 
conditions. 
 
 9. See, e.g., Levy v. Urbach, 651 F.2d 1278, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 1981) (reinstating 
the plaintiffs’ claims for hazard pay after working with persons afflicted with leprosy). 
 10. See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 
752, 758, 768–70 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (requiring a school for the mentally retarded to 
implement a number of institutional changes immediately and submit periodic reports 
regarding the school’s progress); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 
1974) (holding that the district court may use a flexible concept of due process to 
determine the plaintiffs’ rights and set the baseline of minimally adequate treatment), 
aff’d, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 
334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258, 1266–67 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (issuing a series of preliminary orders 
designed to ensure an adequate education was provided to all mentally retarded 
children), adopted, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
 11. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 796–97 (1973) (deciding which 
congressional reapportionment plan should be used for state elections); 67th Minn. State 
Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 195 (1972) (holding explicitly that judges possess the 
power to reapportion state legislature districting when the legislature’s statutory 
decisions are unconstitutional); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161–63 (1971) 
(reversing the district court’s reapportionment based on inappropriate grounds, but 
affirming the principle that courts may order redistricting when appropriate). 
 12. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 402–03 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (creating 
a new city government plan that provided a realistic opportunity “to elect blacks to the 
city governing body”), rev’d, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 13. See Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable 
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). 
 14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II]. 
 16. Id. at 301. 
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Many believe that the Court had no choice but to go slow in Brown.  
Had the Court ordered an immediate end to segregation, it would have 
encountered massive resistance17 and might have encouraged white 
flight, leading to the closing of public schools throughout the South.18  
For an institution like the United States Supreme Court, dependent as it 
is on public respect as well as on the willingness of public officials to 
follow its decisions, such consequences might have been devastating.  
Accordingly, in Brown II, the Court played for time and did nothing to 
enforce Brown II’s “all deliberate speed” mandates for many years.  
Even as late as the mid-1960s, many black children were still attending 
segregated schools.19 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education20 signaled an 
end to the Court’s go slow approach.  In Swann, although the trial court 
allowed school officials to submit three separate and distinct desegregation 
plans, the trial court rejected all three plans as constitutionally inadequate.  
In frustration, the trial court decided to desegregate the school system 
itself, based on the advice of an outside consultant.  In the decade that 
followed, the federal courts entered structural orders in a number of 
school desegregation cases.21  Some of the orders were sweeping in 
 
 17. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
29–30 (1998): 
   The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown II reflected the justices’ understanding 
that they were initiating a social revolution.  The Court feared that because 
deeply entrenched Southern attitudes and institutions were completely 
unprepared for immediate desegregation, anything more than a gradualist 
approach would inevitably lead to violence.  As it turned out, [the Court’s 
approach] probably encouraged violence by allowing enough time for 
opposition to desegregation to build while holding out hope that the decision 
could be reversed. . . . 
 . . . [The decision] also encouraged Southern public officials to claim that 
they were performing their legal duties whenever they refused to integrate 
facilities because there was a threat of violence. 
 18. See Lino A. Graglia, The Brown Cases Revisited: Where Are They Now?, 1 
BENCHMARK 23, 27 (Mar.–Apr. 1984): 
There can be little doubt that if the Court had ordered the end of segregation in 
1954 or 1955 the result would have been the closing of public schools in much 
of the South, about which the Court could have done nothing.  The principal 
impact would have been on poor blacks, and Brown could have come to be 
seen as a blunder and symbol of judicial impotence. 
 19. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 1124 (9th 
ed. 2001) (“[O]nly 2.14% of black students in the eleven ‘southern states’ attended 
schools in which they were not the racial majority.”). 
 20. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 21. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78–80 (1995) (explaining the 
district court’s complex remedial plan’s considerable expenses and difficult goals); 
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 453, 455 (1979) (enjoining the school 
district from continued discriminatory practices); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 739 
(1974) (explaining the district court’s order designed to include areas of predominantly 
white population within the school district to end substantial racial segregation), aff’d, 
WEAVER.DOC 8/21/2019  1:43 PM 
[VOL. 41:  1617, 2004]  The Rise and Decline of Structural Remedies 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1621 
scope.  As one commentator noted, the school desegregation decrees 
fundamentally remade American schools in virtually every way: 
   Brown was said to require nothing less than the transformation of “dual school 
systems” into “unitary, nonracial school systems,” and that entailed thoroughgoing 
organizational reform.  It required new procedures for the assignment of 
students; new criteria for the construction of schools; reassignment of faculty; 
revision of the transportation systems to accommodate new routes and new 
distances; reallocation of resources among schools and among new activities; 
curriculum modification; increased appropriations; revision of interscholastic 
sports schedules; new information systems for monitoring the performance of 
the organization; and more.  In time it was understood that desegregation was a 
total transformational process in which the judge undertook the reconstruction 
of an ongoing social institution.22 
Following Brown and the other school desegregation cases, orders of 
similar scope were entered in the prison cases.  For example, in Hutto v. 
Finney,23 the federal courts were confronted by an Arkansas prison 
system that they described as “a dark and evil world completely alien to 
the free world.”24  Although many of the system’s facilities were 
overcrowded, the prison system continued to receive large numbers of 
prisoners (one facility was deemed to be overcrowded with 1000 
prisoners, but was gradually allowed to increase to 1500 prisoners).  
Prisoners were often subjected to punishments, including “punitive 
isolation,” that the Court described as “cruel, unusual, and unpredictable.”25  
The prison’s punitive isolation system placed four to eleven inmates per 
cell in 8’ x 10’ cells containing only water and a toilet that could only be 
flushed from outside the cell.  At night, the prisoners were given 
mattresses to place on the floor.  However, even though some prisoners 
had infectious diseases (e.g., hepatitis and venereal disease), the 
mattresses were stored together in piles during the day and returned 
randomly to prisoners at night.  Punitive isolation prisoners received 
only 1000 calories a day consisting of “grue” which the Court described 
as “a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, 
vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture in a 
 
433 U.S. 267 (1977); Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 194 (1973) (explaining the 
district court’s enforcement of a remedial plan to end segregation in the school district). 
 22. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1979). 
 23. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
 24. Id. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)). 
 25. Id. at 682. 
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pan.”26  Because punitive isolation prisoners were the most antisocial, 
jail guards frequently used nightsticks and mace to maintain control.27  
Some prisoners remained in isolation for months on end.28 
In response to these conditions, the trial court imposed a number of 
restrictions on the Arkansas system: it limited the number of inmates 
who could be confined in each cell, required that each prisoner be given 
a bunk, discontinued the grue diet, and limited isolation sentences to 
thirty days.29  The United States Supreme Court upheld the trial court 
order noting that Arkansas had been repeatedly notified of the 
constitutional violations, but failed to remedy them.  In addition, the 
Court concluded that the trial court restrictions were directly designed to 
remedy the problems that the trial court identified.30 
If Swann can be regarded as the beginning of the structural remedy, 
the decision in Missouri v. Jenkins31 represents the remedy’s zenith.  In 
Jenkins, the trial court found that the Kansas City, Missouri school 
district was segregated.  However, since the school district was more 
than 68% black, it was difficult to reassign students in ways that would 
create integration.  Unable to sweep suburban school districts into its 
decree, the court decided against additional intradistrict reassignments 
because it feared that such transfers would drive nonminority students 
away and decrease stability.  Instead, the court decided to improve the 
district’s educational programs in the hope that the improvements would 
make the district attractive to nonminority students and thereby create 
“desegregative attractiveness.”  To this end, the Court allowed district 
officials to “dream” about how to improve their system, and the court 
then granted their dream by ordering the state to spend of vast sums of 
money on the district.  These sums included $220 million on quality 
 
 26. Id. at 683. 
 27. Id. at 684. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 685–88. 
 30. The order is supported by the interdependence of the conditions producing  
the violation.  The vandalized cells and the atmosphere of violence were 
attributable, in part, to overcrowding and to deep-seated enmities growing out 
of months of constant daily friction.  The 30-day limit will help to correct these 
conditions.  Moreover, the limit presents little danger of interference with 
prison administration, for the Commissioner of Correction himself stated that 
prisoners should not ordinarily be held in punitive isolation for more than 14 
days.  Finally, the exercise of discretion in this case is entitled to special 
deference because of the trial judge’s years of experience with the problem at 
hand and his recognition of the limits on a federal court’s authority in a case of 
this kind.  Like the Court of Appeals, we find no error in the inclusion of a 30-
day limitation on sentences to punitive isolation as a part of the District 
Court’s comprehensive remedy. 
Id. at 688. 
 31. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
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education programs, $260 million on capital improvements, and nearly 
$448 million on magnet schools.32 
The United States Supreme Court ultimately held that the trial court 
had exceeded its authority in focusing on the principle of desegregative 
attractiveness, as well as in requiring the state to finance the program of 
attractiveness.  The Court noted: 
   The purpose of desegregative attractiveness has been not only to remedy the 
systemwide reduction in student achievement, but also to attract nonminority 
students not presently enrolled in the KCMSD. . . . 
   . . . . 
   . . . But this interdistrict goal is beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation 
identified by the District Court. . . .  [T]he District Court has devised a remedy 
to accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks the remedial authority to 
mandate directly: the interdistrict transfer of students. . . . 
   . . . . 
   The District Court’s pursuit of “desegregative attractiveness” cannot be 
reconciled with our cases placing limitations on a district court’s remedial 
authority. . . .  [T]his rationale is not susceptible to any objective limitation. . . . 
   Nor are there limits to the duration of District Court’s involvement. . . .33 
III.  THE DECLINE OF STRUCTURALISM 
Just as the school desegregation cases led to the rise in structuralism, 
they have also led to some decline in the use of that remedy.  In many 
parts of the country, the courts have started terminating their control 
over local school districts and returning those districts to the control of 
local officials.  For example, in Oklahoma City Board of Education v. 
Dowell,34 the Court held that the Oklahoma City school district should 
be released from a desegregation decree.  Likewise, in Freeman v. Pitts, 
the Court granted a Georgia school district local control.35 
In terminating the school desegregation decrees, the Court has 
emphasized the importance of returning control over school districts to 
local officials and the need for judicial intervention to be of limited 
duration.  As the Court stated in Jenkins, “local autonomy of school 
districts is a vital national tradition, . . . [and] a district court must strive 
to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system 
 
 32. Id. at 76–78. 
 33. Id. at 91–100. 
 34. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 35. 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992). 
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operating in compliance with the Constitution.”36  The Court sounded 
similar themes in Freeman v. Pitts,37 noting that once desegregation has 
been implemented, the impetus and need for structural decrees 
diminishes. 
In addition, the Court has begun to place limits on the availability of 
structural remedies in the first place.  The need for limitations became 
quickly evident after Swann as plaintiffs began seeking structural 
remedies in a diverse array of cases.  In O’Shea v. Littleton, 
respondents—black citizens who had been advocating for equality in 
employment, housing, education, and participation in governmental 
decisionmaking—began an economic boycott of local merchants 
opposed to equality.38  Respondents claimed that the county magistrate 
and judge had singled them out for harsh treatment because of their 
advocacy as well as because of the boycott.  Specifically, respondents 
alleged that the judge and magistrate discriminated against petitioners by 
setting higher bond requirements and jury fees in criminal cases, and by 
imposing higher criminal sentences.  Respondents sought an injunction 
prohibiting the discrimination.39 
In O’Shea, the Court concluded that respondents were not entitled to 
relief.  Inter alia, the Court held that none of the respondents could 
satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement.  The Court 
concluded that those who had been subjected to the alleged practices in 
the past could not show a case or controversy because “[p]ast exposure 
to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy 
regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any 
continuing, present adverse effects.”40  The Court found no continuing 
effects because none of the petitioners were then serving an allegedly 
illegal sentence or awaiting trial.  As to those who had been unlawfully 
convicted and were serving illegal sentences, the Court concluded that 
judicial intervention was inappropriate because “the complaint would 
inappropriately be seeking relief from or modification of current, 
existing custody.”41  As to those that were then subject to criminal 
proceedings, the Court found that federal intervention was inappropriate 
under the Court’s prior decision in Younger v. Harris.42  Younger 
announced federalism principles which suggested that federal courts 
should not enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings because 
 
 36. 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995). 
 37. 503 U.S. at 489. 
 38. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1974). 
 39. Id. at 491–92. 
 40. Id. at 495–96. 
 41. Id. at 496. 
 42. Id. at 496–97. 
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plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law under state law (they can raise 
their constitutional claims in the state proceedings), and federal courts 
should show respect for state officials and state proceedings.43 
The O’Shea Court did recognize that respondents might be arrested 
again, and therefore might be again subject to the illegal practices.  
However, the Court found this possibility insufficient to justify judicial 
intervention, noting that there was no allegation that any Illinois law was 
unconstitutional on its face.  As a result, the Court found that the alleged 
injury was not sufficiently real and immediate since the Court was 
unwilling to “anticipate whether and when these respondents will be 
charged with crime and will be made to appear before either petitioner 
takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture.”44  Moreover, the 
Court emphasized that federalism principles militated against judicial 
intervention,45 and that respondents would have numerous judicial 
remedies available to them.46 
 
 43. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). 
 44. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 497. 
 45. The Court has recently reaffirmed the “basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence  
that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a 
criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law 
and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”  [Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971).]  Additionally, recognition of the need for a 
proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels 
restraint against the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in 
the administration of the State’s criminal laws in the absence of a showing of 
irreparable injury which is “‘both great and immediate.’”  [Id. at 46.] 
   . . . Apparently the order would contemplate interruption of state proceedings 
to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners.  This seems to us 
nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which 
would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris . . . 
and related cases sought to prevent. . . . 
   . . . An injunction of the type contemplated by respondents and the Court of 
Appeals would disrupt the normal course of proceedings in the state courts via 
resort to the federal suit for determination of the claim ab initio, just as would 
the request for injunctive relief from an ongoing state prosecution against the 
federal plaintiff which was found to be unwarranted in Younger. 
Id. at 499–501. 
 46. And if any of the respondents are ever prosecuted and face trial, or if they  
are illegally sentenced, there are available state and federal procedures which 
could provide relief from the wrongful conduct alleged.  Open to a victim of 
the discriminatory practices asserted under state law are the right to a 
substitution of judge or a change of venue, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, §§ 114–5, 
114–6 (1971), review on direct appeal or on postconviction collateral review, 
and the opportunity to demonstrate that the conduct of these judicial officers is 
so prejudicial to the administration of justice that available disciplinary 
proceedings, including the possibility of suspension or removal, are warranted.  
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O’Shea was followed by the holding in Rizzo v. Goode.47  In Rizzo, 
respondents sued a city, its mayor, and other police officials claiming 
civil rights violations and seeking sweeping relief, including the 
appointment of a receiver to supervise the police department and civilian 
review of police activity.  The trial court entered an extensive order 
imposing procedures for the handling of complaints against the police 
(requiring ready availability of complaint forms, a screening procedure 
for eliminating frivolous complaints, prompt and adequate investigation 
of complaints, adjudication of nonfrivolous complaints by an impartial 
individual or body using fair procedures, and prompt notification to the 
parties regarding the outcome), mandating the revision of police recruit 
manuals and rules of procedure, and requiring the maintenance of 
statistical records and summaries designed to allow the court to 
determine how the revised complaint process was working.48 
In entering the order, the trial court recognized that respondents had 
no constitutional right to improved police procedures for handling 
civilian complaints, but the court imposed the order nonetheless because 
violations of constitutional rights had occurred in “unacceptably high” 
numbers and were likely to continue to occur absent judicial intervention.49  
The trial court found that, in the absence of changed disciplinary 
procedures, unconstitutional incidents were likely to continue to occur, 
not necessarily with respect to the respondents, but as to other members 
of the classes they represented.50 
 
Ill. Const., Art. VI, § 15(e).  In appropriate circumstances, moreover, federal 
habeas relief would undoubtedly be available. 
Id. at 502. 
 47. 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976). 
 48. (1) Appropriate revision of police manuals and rules of procedure spelling  
out in some detail, in simple language, the ‘dos and don’ts’ of permissible 
conduct in dealing with civilians (for example, manifestations of racial bias, 
derogatory remarks, offensive language, etc.; unnecessary damage to property 
and other unreasonable conduct in executing search warrants; limitations on 
pursuit of persons charged only with summary offenses; recording and 
processing civilian complaints, etc.).  (2) Revision of procedures for processing 
complaints against police, including (a) ready availability of forms for use by 
civilians in lodging complaints against police officers; (b) a screening 
procedure for eliminating frivolous complaints; (c) prompt and adequate 
investigation of complaints; (d) adjudication of nonfrivolous complaints by an 
impartial individual or body, insulated so far as practicable from chain of 
command pressures, with a fair opportunity afforded the complainant to 
present his complaint, and to the police officer to present his defense; and (3) 
prompt notification to the concerned parties, informing them of the outcome. 
Id. at 365, 369–70 (quoting the district court opinion). 
 49. Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 
357 F. Supp. 1289, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d in part, Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 
(3d Cir. 1974), rev’d,  423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
 50. Id. 
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In striking down the trial court’s order, the United States Supreme 
Court invoked justiciability concepts and federalism principles.  Relying 
on O’Shea, the Court questioned whether respondents could show a 
“real and immediate” injury because the claim depended “not upon what 
the named petitioners might do to them in the future[,] . . . but upon what 
one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the 
future because of that unknown policeman’s perception of departmental 
disciplinary procedures.”51  The Court found the connection too speculative. 
The Court also rejected the trial court’s conclusion that relief was 
appropriate based on the United States Supreme Court’s prior holdings 
in Brown and Swann.52  The trial court placed great weight on the fact 
that plaintiffs (respondents) showed that there was an “unacceptably 
high” number of incidents of constitutional dimension (around twenty  
listed incidents in a city of three million inhabitants, with 7500 
policemen).53  The Court rejected the analogy to Swann noting that the 
segregation imposed by law in that case had been implemented by state 
authorities for varying periods of time, and the administrators and school 
board members, against whom relief was sought, had been found by 
their own conduct in the administration of the school system to have 
violated constitutional rights.  In Rizzo, the Court found that those 
defendants against whom injunctive relief was directed had not deprived 
the respondent classes of any rights secured under the Constitution.  
Having found that the officials had committed no constitutional 
violation, the Court concluded that equitable relief was inappropriate.54 
In Rizzo, respondents also argued that the people have the “‘right’ to 
be protected from unconstitutional exercises of police power,” which 
justifies equitable intervention.55  In other words, or so they argued, the 
courts should fashion “prophylactic procedures” that would minimize 
police misconduct.56  The Court disagreed, noting that “the nature of the 
violation determines the scope of the remedy,” and that federalism 
principles militate against structural relief.57  “Where, as here, the exercise 
of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be 
constantly mindful of the ‘special delicacy of the adjustment to be 
 
 51. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372–73. 
 52. Id. at 377. 
 53. Id. at 373. 
 54. Id. at 377. 
 55. Id. at 377–78. 
 56. Id. at 378. 
 57. Id. 
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preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of 
its own law.’”58  The Court concluded that a state should be “granted the 
widest latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs.’”59  The Court 
also concluded that the trial court’s decision to revamp the department’s 
internal procedures “was indisputably a sharp limitation on the 
department’s ‘latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs.’’”60  In 
addition, federal courts are required to be sensitive to the functioning of 
state and local agencies.61 
IV.  REFLECTIONS ON STRUCTURALISM 
In a short paper such as this, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive 
evaluation of the structural remedy.  For a more thorough evaluation, the 
reader is referred to the many articles on the subject.62  However, a 
number of observations are in order regarding the availability and use of 
structural remedies over the last five decades. 
First, courts can and should be reluctant to enter structural injunctions.  
Structural remedies inevitably involve judges in performing nonjudicial 
functions beyond the scope of their expertise and, sometimes, beyond 
their assigned role.63  Courts have involved themselves to a staggering 
degree, especially in the desegregation cases.  As one commentator 
noted, under structural decrees, courts have “exercised traditionally 
 
 58. Id. (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951)). 
 59. Id. at 378–79 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 896 (1961)). 
 60. Id. at 379 (citations omitted). 
 61. Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part in  
governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments, 
though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in 
cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have 
not been limited either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding 
itself.  We think these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive 
relief is sought, not against the judicial branch of the state government, but 
against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local 
governments such as petitioners here. 
Id. at 380. 
 62. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: 
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in 
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Fiss, supra note 22; Gerald E. 
Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978); Robert D. 
Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: 
Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265; Paul J. Mishkin, 
Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978); Nagel, supra 
note 13; David Rudenstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 611 (1983). 
 63. See Nagel, supra note 13, at 662. 
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executive functions by appointing executive and quasi-executive officers 
responsible to the judiciary and by determining administrative processes 
in elaborately detailed decrees.”64  In addition, courts “have exercised 
legislative functions by setting policy standards for the operation of state 
and federal programs, including the setting of budgetary requirements.”65 
Many scholars believe that judges are no better suited to exercise 
multiple powers (i.e., legislative, executive, and judicial) than any other 
branch.  Indeed, as James Madison argued, “if the judicial power were 
joined with the legislative and executive powers, judges ‘might behave 
with all the violence of an oppressor.’”66  There is much wisdom in these 
arguments. 
Second, as a general rule, structural remedies should be used only as a 
last resort.  At the federal level, the United States Constitution divides 
powers between three separate and relatively distinct branches of 
government.  The Constitution also provides for an allocation of powers 
between the federal government and state governments, and gives the 
states a legitimate and important role.  As one commentator noted, “the 
language of the 10th amendment strongly implies that the states are 
protected from the judicial exercise of legislative or executive powers.”67  
As a result, local school officials, rather than courts, are charged with 
responsibility for running local schools.  Likewise, prison officials are 
charged with running prisons.  Courts are obligated to respect this 
allocation of responsibilities. 
Third, even if the federal courts show restraint, structural remedies 
will sometimes be necessary and appropriate.  In both Swann and Hutto, 
although the courts found serious constitutional violations, state and 
local officials did nothing to correct them.  Brown and the school 
desegregation cases arose during a period of hostility to school 
desegregation.  Had the courts not imposed structural remedies, it is 
unlikely that desegregation would have occurred.  Indeed, although 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 663 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 326 (James Madison) (J. Cooke 
ed., 1961)). 
 67. Nagel, supra note 13, at 667.  Nagel went on to state that the need for restraint 
is especially appropriate when the federal judiciary acts against state governments: “The 
substitution of government by the federal judiciary for local self-government involves 
dangerous disproportionality; it sacrifices fundamental democratic values in order to 
vindicate particular constitutional rights.  Specific rights of specific plaintiffs are secured 
by autocratic mechanisms of broad impact.”  Id. at 664. 
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Brown II ordered schools to desegregate “with all deliberate speed,” 
most school districts did little or nothing to desegregate.  In Swann, 
which was decided sixteen years after Brown II, the Court still found 
significant resistance to desegregation.  The trial judge gave the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district three different opportunities to 
submit desegregation plans, but it never submitted an acceptable plan.  
In frustration, the trial court appointed an outside expert to create the 
plan.  Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court upheld this approach, 
noting that “[i]f school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations [to 
desegregate,] judicial authority may be invoked.”68 
The prison cases involved similar recalcitrance.  In Hutto, the trial 
court began by directing the Department of Correction to “make a 
substantial start” toward improving conditions, and to file reports on its 
progress.69  In addition, the trial court repeatedly gave prison administrators 
the opportunity to cure unconstitutional conditions.70  Only after repeated 
failures did the trial court impose guidelines.  Those guidelines focused 
on four major issues: “improving conditions in the isolation cells, increasing 
inmate safety, eliminating the barracks sleeping arrangements, and putting 
an end to the trusty system.”71  When even these guidelines did not work, 
the trial court entered more specific orders discontinuing the grue diet, 
limiting the number of men who could be confined in a single cell, 
requiring that each prisoner be given a bunk, and limiting isolation to a 
maximum of thirty days.72  Absent such specific intervention, the prison 
system might never have changed. 
Fourth, some structural cases involve complicated questions about 
when courts should defer to the decisions of local governmental 
officials, and the courts must be respectful of all aspects of government 
affected by their decisions.  For example, in Jenkins, the trial court gave 
local officials (a school board) the chance to develop the desegregation 
plan, but still showed little respect for state and local officials.73  The 
trial court admitted that it allowed the local school board to “dream” 
about the type of school district that it desired to have, and the types of 
changes that would be needed to implement that dream.74  The trial court 
judge then granted the dream even though the district did not have the 
money to pay for the dream, and ordered state officials to come up with 
 
 68. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 
 69. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 683 (1978). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 684. 
 73. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 74. Id. at 79. 
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the money.75  The net effect was that the Kansas City, Missouri school 
district received a very large infusion of funds, but many other schools 
that depended on state funding received budget cuts and suffered 
mightily to finance the dreams of Kansas City officials.76  In addition, 
the legislature was deprived, in significant measure, of its right to decide 
how state funds should be allocated.  The trial court’s decision showed a 
lack of sensitivity to state budgets as well as to the need for state 
officials to determine how state money should be spent. 
Fifth, structural remedies should be limited to correcting the 
constitutional violation.  A court should make every effort to avoid a 
Jenkins type effort to completely rebuild a school system at another 
party’s (the State of Missouri’s) expense in pursuit of goals (e.g., 
“desegregative attractiveness”) that bear little relationship to the 
constitutional injury. 
Sixth, and finally, structural remedies should last no longer than 
necessary.  As soon as they can rectify the constitutional violation, 
courts should return executive and legislative functions to those officials 
responsible for exercising them.  When power rightfully rests in state 
and local officials, it should be returned to them as soon as possible. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
During the last half century, the structural remedy has had a major 
impact on U.S. society and has been used to effectuate sweeping 
changes in schools, prisons, and other institutions.  But society, courts, 
and commentators have never been entirely comfortable with the structural 
remedy.  Structural injunctions frequently involve courts entering 
decrees that involve continuing supervision problems and supervising 
how state and local officials (and sometimes federal officials) do their 
jobs.  Many of these decrees were a necessary response to difficult 
societal problems, particularly segregation. 
Even though the school desegregation cases appear to be waning, 
there are other areas where structural remedies remain appropriate.  One 
of those areas is with regard to prison litigation.  In general, inmates 
constitute a despised minority, many of whom have no say in the 
political process because felons are deprived of their right to vote.  
Moreover, taxpayers and voters often rebel against spending money on 
 
 75. Id. at 79–80. 
 76. Id. at 99. 
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inmates or prisons, and some even feel that punitive prison conditions 
are justified retribution against criminals.  As a result, few politicians are 
willing to spend money on prisons or inmates, especially in difficult 
economic times (like now).  Absent judicial intervention to ensure 
prisoners humane conditions, prisoners are likely to be left in intolerable 
conditions.  Similar considerations might dictate relief for the mentally 
or physically handicapped, and other groups who are less able to 
advocate for their rights. 
 
